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Scenario Report
Introduction
Purpose : The Center for Advanced Computation of the University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign is preparing a three year research
plan to develop network data management and a resource sharing
technology for application in the World-Wide Military Command
and Control System (WWMCCS) Intercomputer Network (WIN) . This
work is supported by the Joint Technical Support Activity of
the Defense Communications Agency.
As part of the preparation of the research plan, scenarios
were generated to help expose potential problem areas. There
has been no attempt in the scenario effort to solve the problems
discovered or to estimate research difficulty or potential pay-
off. Where appropriate, some preliminary research studies were
undertaken to estimate research difficulty and probability of
success. Those studies are separately documented in the Prelimi-
nary Research Study Report (CAC Doc. No. 162, JTSA Doc. No. 5509).
Each of the following scenarios attempts to:
1) identify some of the major research questions in distributed
data management
2) eliminate those design alternatives which are obviously
infeasible
3) analyze the impact of the design alternatives not only
on the technical considerations of network traffic, processor
loads, storage requirements, etc. but also on the non-technical
issues of security, command authority, etc.
It should be emphasized that these scenarios are internal
working papers. By their very nature, it is not possible to go
into any great detail in any one topic. These scenarios are
presented in the hope that they will stimulate the same kinds
of discussions externally that they have already done internally.
Format : Each scenario will be a terse discussion of a potential design
alternative. To aid the reader, a standard format is adopted.
Short title
Feasibility : An overall assessment with capsule summary of reasons for
the judgement
Design Issue Addressed : Self-explanatory
Description : Self-explantory
Example : Self-explanatory
Effects : a. Network traffic
b. Processor loads
c. Reliability/ survivability
d. Storage requirements
e. Response time for queries
f. Ease of update
g. Security
Summary : Self-explantory
The scenarios are grouped by the design alternative studied.
Within an alternative they are ordered by increasing complexity.
Assumptions : The paradigm for these scenarios is a network of large
scale computer systems (hosts) connected like the PWIN or the ARPA net-
work. A large number of users (hundreds) of widely varying levels of
computer familiarity are working on-line to the various hosts. The
dominant work activity is some task which requires access to the data
bases provided by the hosts. Some of these data bases are distributed,
that is, no single host contains all the segments of the data base. We
shall focus exclusively on the distributed data bases, and will omit the
"distributed" for brevity. Two generic user activities can occur:
inquiry and update. Each of these generic types affects network traffic
in different ways.
An inquiry is input to the host to which the user is connected.
The data base is searched and the data relevant to the user's inquiry
is returned to the person. Two types of network traffic may result from
inquiries. The first is the transmission of the inquiry to remote hosts
when needed segments of the data base are not locally available. The
second is the reply information from these remote hosts.
An update differs from an inquiry in that updates modify the data
base and inquiries do not. Hence inquiries need only be directed to a
single copy of a data base while updates must be reflected in all copies
of a data base.
A basic assumption which is manifest in many of the scenarios
is that communication exchanges via the network require on the order of
tenths of seconds to complete. Thus, many operations which are acceptable
when communication between processes requires microseconds (i.e. via
shared memory) become totally impossible when the required communication
takes three or four orders of magnitude more time to complete.
Organization : The seven scenarios of this report may be divided into
two classes by the topic addressed:
1) allocation and role of data base segments
a. single copy
b. single copy with remote passive backup
c. single copy with remote active backup
d. multiple primary copies
2) techniques for data security
a. all security checks performed locally
b. all security checks performed at host where the segment
is located
c. security checks performed both locally and at the host
where the segment is resident
Single Copy of Each Data Segment
Feasibility : FEASIBLE, current operating mode. (Where all segments are
located at a single host, the distributed data base becomes a simple,
remotely accessible data base.)
Design Issues Addressed : Segment allocation.
Description : A single copy of each segment is maintained, different
segments may be resident at different hosts. Inquiries and updates
are directed towards the appropriate segment using the network if the
segment is not locally available.
Example : A network-wide, distributed FORSTAT data base exists. Each
host physically has the segments of the data base for which the command
is functionally responsible. When information not available locally is
requested by a user, the network is used to transmit the query to other
sites. For example, a user at LANTCOM may request information from MAC
about airlift capability. Because hosts represent functional areas,
most updates would originate at the host where the segment is located.
Thus, most updates for a MAC segment will originate within MAC.
Inquiries - Updates
Figure 1. Single copy
Effects : a. Network traffic . In a PWIN/WIN environment it is heavily
application dependent whether or not update (or inquiry) traffic
will add to the network load. For some applications, all the updates
are transmitted via the network; for others, none are. This repre-
sents an important measurement area. Inquiries must be directed to
the host with the appropriate segment via the network.
b. Processor loads . For segments which are "popular," a
large portion of the processor load for that segment may be exter-
nally imposed. In general, the total amount of processing is not
much greater than the case where a non-distributed data base is
remotely accessed. A slight increase occurs over a simple remotely
accessed data base because the querying host may have to do some
directory processing to determine where a given segment is.
c. Reliability . Since only one copy of a given segment is
maintained, reliability is low. The loss of that host would make
the segment unavailable to any user
.
d. Storage requirements . The single copy alternative requires
the minimum storage for data segments. There is an increase in the
storage needed for directories over a simple remotely accessed
data base because the directory must include host location of the
segments.
e. Response time for queries . Response is limited by two
factors, network latency and segment owner host processing. Since
a remote query must pass through the network, it incurs any network
delays, such as delays in the orginating host, the communication
subnet, and the receiving host. The processing of the query can
occur on only one host, and is thus limited by the load on that
host. If other processing has higher priority, the query cannot
be farmed out to a less busy host.
f. Ease of update . Update is nearly identical to that which
occurs in a simple, remotely accessed data base.
g. Security . Because the data base is distributed, the input
to the security decision-making process must also be distributed.
It would seem unreasonable, for example, to expect that LANTCOM
would maintain security profile information (clearances, special
access caveats, etc.) for every possible user of the LANTCOM-owned
segments. It is equally unreasonable to expect that LANTCOM would
allow a remote user unrestricted access. An important area of
research is the mechanization of security controls in distributed
data base management. (The security scenarios elaborate upon
these points.) The single segment copy design alternative does
help the situation. The sensitive information is available in
only one location. In the PWTN/WIN environment that location is
likely to be the organization with command responsibilities over
the data, and is thus in a favorable position to make access control
decisions.
immary : This is what typically is envisioned when a distributed data
base is proposed. It allows the distributed data base to be viewed
as a more conventional data base in which some of the segments are
stored on a network virtual peripheral. That is, the segments are
actually located on another host, and are accessible via the net-
work. Some theoretical work has been done on the problem of where
to locate a data base segment in a network, but the realities of
the PWIN/WIN environment may impose constraints which preclude
technically optimal allocation strategies. The single copy scheme
offers reasonably easy management of the distributed data base,
but has poor reliability.
Single Primary Copy with Passive Backup Copies
(Remote Journalling)
Feasibility : FEASIBLE, but network traffic increases.
Design Issues Addressed : Segment allocation.
Description : The basic mechanism is the single segment copy scheme. To
improve data base reliability and survivability, a journal of update
transactions to the primary segment is kept at one or more remote hosts
along with an old copy of the segment. The journal information is sent
via the network. In the event of loss of the primary segment (or host),
the remote journal is processed on the old copy to create a new primary
copy.
Example : A segment owned by REDCOM is backed up by a remote journal
stored at SAC. Minimal processing of the remote journal occurs.
Periodically an up-to-date copy of the data base segment from REDCOM,
incorporating previously journalled information, is obtained and the
journalling process is restarted.
Inquiries
Updates
Figure 2. Single copy with passive
backup
Effects : a. Network traffic . An additional message is generated for
each remote journal by each update. If the potential loss of the
most recent updates can be tolerated, updates may be collected
together and shipped in a larger unit, improving the network through-
put. Inquiry traffic remains the same as the single copy case.
b. Processor loads . Some additional load is imposed on the
processors keeping remote journals. In the event of loss of the
primary copy, a remote host will become the designated temporary
owner for the duration of the loss. The data base segment must
first be regenerated, and then the inquiry and update loads for
the segment must be accepted. A decision may have to be made
about the importance of this new workload relative to the normal
site workload.
c. Reliability . Remote journalling is, in reality, a sophis-
ticated form of off-site backup. It offers impressive gains in
reliability at low cost. If the backup copy is very old and the
backup processor is heavily loaded, there may be a period of up
to several hours when the segment will be unavailable because it
is being regenerated.
d. Storage requirements . The remote journal will be small.
For example, CINCPAC indicated less than 5% change per cycle of
their 40 million byte FORSTAT data base or less than 2 million
bytes per cycle. Also, many of these changes are to highly vola-
tile items like ship movement information. Thus, a copy of the
data base and a week of updates could be stored on about 5 reels
of tape or about half a DSS 190 disk.
e. Response time for queries . Unchanged over single copy.
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f. Ease of update . The only change over the single copy
case is that a remote journal entry must be created. Since jour-
nalling is normally done locally anyway, this would seem to impose
a minor added task.
g. Security . Security may potentially be more compromised
over the single copy case because the capability exists to create
a duplicate of the data base at the remote journal site. This
could be prevented by the application of a privacy transformation
(encryption) to the remote journal, with the key available only
in an emergency, i.e., when the segment must be regenerated. The
subject of privacy transformations on data bases is a potentially
fruitful area of research, particularly if it is combined with
file compression techniques.
Another security consideration is that in the event that
the segment must be regenerated, the user profile data at the
original host site will be needed for security decisions at the
new host. If this is not done, the regenerated copy will either
be unusable (because no user has authorization to access it) or
unprotected (because no user is denied access to it) . It would
seem to be another research area to study mechanisms for achieving
an orderly transition from primary to regenerated backup copy.
Summary : For data base segments whose loss can be tolerated for a
limited but not indefinite time, remote journalling seems to
provide a reasonable alternative.
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Single Primary Copy with Active Backup Copies
(Running Spares)
Feasibility ; FEASIBLE, but network traffic and prime time remote processor
loading increase.
Design Issues Addressed : Segment allocation.
Description : A given segment is duplicated at each of a number of hosts.
One host is designated the primary host and is responsible for the
synchronization and propagation of updates to each of the secondary
copies. A major research topic is the control of inquiry traffic, i.e.,
who decides which copy will be queried.
Example : A segment which is owned by LANTCOM is duplicated at REDCOM. All
update traffic is directed to LANTCOM, which is responsible for propagating
it to the backup copy. The REDCOM host is responsible for keeping up with
the updates so its copy remains current. Two basic alternatives exist for
inquiry traffic. The first is to send all inquiries to LANTCOM for pro-
cessing (central management) . LANTCOM would then decide whether to do
the processing itself or farm the work out to REDCOM. A second choice
is to simply route the inquiry to any host with a copy (distributed
management). In the case where every host has a copy of a given segment,
no network traffic at all would be generated from inquiries, although the
update traffic load increases.
12
Inquiries Updates
Inquiry
Replies
a. Central inquiry management
Inquiries
Updates
b. Distributed inquiry management
Figure 3. Single copy with active backup
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Effects : a. Network traffic . As discussed above, the network traffic
is a function of the number of updates, the number of queries and
the number and location of secondary copies. An important component
of any distributed data base model will be estimators for network
traffic in running spare configurations.
b. Processor loads . The network-wide processing load for
maintaining the data base is, approximately, the single site load
multiplied by the number of copies. This occurs because each copy
must be updated along with the primary copy. Such processing may
be partially reduced by doing as much of it as possible at the pri-
mary host, and sending out the updates partially processed. While
passive backups can be updated on low use shifts, active backups
require immediate processing and impact prime shift loads.
c. Reliability . Running spares provide an immediate backup
capability should the primary host become unavailable. Of course,
care must be taken that the transition from primary to secondary
is an orderly one. As mentioned previously, this transition is an
important research area.
d. Storage requirements . The storage required is multiplied
by the number of copies maintained.
e. Response time for queries . Response can improve or degrade
over previous scenarios. If a heavily loaded site passes off an
inquiry to a lightly loaded site, then the response can improve. If,
however, a lightly loaded site passes off to another site, then response
will always degrade due to additional network transit time. Serious
degradation can occur if the receiving site is more heavily loaded
than the site passing off. The distributed inquiry management
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scheme (transmit the inquiry directly to the most responsive/avail-
able processor) may improve the overall response times, since several
processors will be sharing the inquiry load. Research is needed in
this area.
f. Ease of update . Updates remain fairly simple because the
owner host has all the synchronization responsibilities and can
present a well-defined sequence of updates to the backup copies.
g. Security . There is a serious degradation in security
because several up-to-date copies of the data base exist, and the
potential penetrator has a choice of sites. Care must be taken
at the backup sites to assure that the security standards of the
primary copy are maintained. The replication of user profiles
discussed above continues to be required for orderly transition
from primary to backup copy in the event of loss of the primary.
Summary : For those segments whose unavailability cannot be tolerated,
the running spares idea may be the only acceptable alternative.
Depending upon the update/ inquiry mix, the overall network traffic
may actually be reduced over other schemes. This can occur because
inquiries directed at hosts with a copy do not generate spurious
network traffic. A thorough analysis of the costs and benefits of
this design alternative is warranted.
15
Multiple Primary Copies of Data Segments
Feasibility : FEASIBLE, but expensive and difficult due to the necessity
for synchronization. The running spares scheme appears equal or
superior in every situation.
Design Issue Addressed : Segment allocation.
Description : Multiple primary copies are maintained. Both inquiries
and updates may be directed to any copy. Updates are coordinated
via the network with other copies of the segment. No single host
controls the updating.
Example : A data base segment is maintained both by PACOM and NMCSSC.
Inquiries and updates are accepted by either host . The updates
accepted by one host must be coordinated with the other host.
Inquiries
Updates
Inquiries
Updates Updates,
Synchronization
Figure 4. Multiple primary copies
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Ifects : a. Network traffic . Inquiry traffic load is the same as
in the running spares scheme. Because updates must be synchronized
between all copies, network traffic relating to updates is sub-
stantially increased.
b. Processor loads . The processor loads are the same as
the running spares situation plus an additional load due to the
synchronization of updates on multiple copies.
c. Reliability . Reliability is equal to the running spares
scheme.
d. Storage requirements . The same amount of storage is
required as in the running spares situation.
e. Response time for queries . Query response may be
substantially degraded over the running spares situation due to
synchronization delays for updates. In general, inquiries are
not permitted to proceed until the updates for the segment are
completed. If this is not done, a partially completed update
may have left the segment in an unusable state. In the multiple
primary copy case, synchronization takes longer than in the running
spares case. Thus, updates will take longer to complete and seg-
ments will spend more time locked against inquiry, degrading
response time.
f
.
Ease of update . Updates are more complex in the multiple
primary copy situation because they must be synchronized among all
the copies. This will likely require several network messages to
be exchanged. In typical network environments this exchange of
messages may require several seconds to complete. If the synchroni-
zation is ignored, the copies of the data base will become more and
more dissimilar. Consider what happens if two users (user A and
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user B) both attempt to update the same record. If user A wants
to set field X to 10, and user B wants to set X to 12, we must be
sure that the updates are synchronized for all copies of the seg-
ment. The updates must be done in precisely the same order at all
copies, or X will have different values for each copy (10 in some
copies and 12 in others) . The efficient synchronization of multi-
ple hosts is a research question.
g. Security . Since no single host is in control, major
security problems arise that are of the same nature as those of
distributed inquiry management in the running spares situation.
Specifically, it may be hard to enforce the same security con-
straints at every copy.
Summary : The multiple primary copy scheme is harder to manage and has
greater processor loads, greater network traffic, and slower response
time than the other schemes considered. For the alternatives con-
sidered, it appears to offer no advantage over the single primary
with active backup (running spares) scheme in reliability, storage,
security, or command prerogatives. Hence, multiple primary copies
does not appear to be a viable design alternative.
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Local-only Security
Feasibility : Not clear. Requires trust by remote host of local validation
and authentication of user requests.
Design Issue Addressed : Security.
Description : Validation of a user request occurs only at the local host
servicing the user. When the user accesses a remote segment, the
remote host assumes that the request has already been validated.
Example : A user logs on to the host at LANTCOM and issues commands which
cause a data base segment at MAC to be accessed. The MAC data
management system assumes that the LANTCOM data management system
has validated the request and MAC performs only limited authenti-
cation on it.
Effects : a. Network traffic . Since a host maintains little security
information about its remote users, hardly any network traffic
is required to update the remote security information.
b. Processor use . There is minimum processor use because a
user request is checked only once, at its origination.
c. Reliability . Because only the local host has the security
data base, even if a user can get onto the network in some way
which bypasses his failed local host, he may not be able to access
anything. Thus, reliability is low.
d. Storage requirements . This represents the minimum storage
for security-related data.
e. Response time for queries . Not applicable.
f
.
Ease of update . Since only a single copy of the security
data is maintained, it is relatively easy to update.
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g. Security . In order to provide even the most basic
security, the logical link to access the remote data base must
be a protected entity. If this is not done, a process may be
able to masquerade as the local data base management system (dbms)
.
The remote process would have no way of knowing to whom it was
talking - a real data base management system which is indeed doing
the authentication and validation assumed, or a process masquerading
as the dbms and doing no authentication or validation. Implicit
in this discussion is the assumption that the local dbms knows
enough to make security decisions about remote data.
Summary : This design perhaps offers the lowest cost meaningful security
system because it does not duplicate any security information.
There is some question about whether or not it is possible to
operate a "pure" version of this design, since the local authenti-
cation and validation procedures must have a great deal of know-
ledge of the remote data resources in order to make content-sensitive
security decisions. It is also not clear whether any existing
operating system is secure enough to warrant the expenditure of
scarce resources in pursuit of the more difficult goal of data
base management system security.
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Remote-Only Security
Feasibility : Not clear. Requires extensive maintenance of remote
security related data bases that may be used very infrequently.
Design Issue Addressed : Security.
Description : Validation of a user request occurs at the host answering
it, whether local or remote.
Example : A user at LANTCOM issues requests for information. For those
which can be answered locally, the LANTCOM host does all the
validation of the request. For those requests which access remote
data, the LANTCOM host performs minimal security related work. The
request is passed on almost unchecked to the remote host. There,
the validation is performed in a manner almost identical to that
which occurs for a request local to that host.
Effects : The effects are almost identical to those encountered in the
use of running spares (one primary copy of a segment with multiple
backup copies) . The host where the user is local (most likely his
command) has the responsibility of maintaining the security data
at the other hosts of the network.
Summary : This approach is quite attractive from a theoretical stand-
point. There are no "back doors" into the data base. All requests
receive similar validation whether they originated locally or
remotely. The major problem with a "pure" implementation of this
approach is that the security data must be kept up-to-date at all
the remote sites. It may be possible to mollify these objections
by allowing some compromise between local-only and remote-only
security, such as that outlined in the next scenario.
21
Send-Ahead Security
Feasibility : Probably feasible, this approach is analogous to the
practice of sending clearance information ahead of a visit.
Design Issue Addressed : Security.
Description : Before a user may access a remote data base segment his
clearances must be sent to the remote host. From then on the
system proceeds in a manner similar to the remote-only security
scenario.
Example : It is determined that a REDCOM user needs to have access to
LANTCOM data. The security information about the user is sent
from REDCOM to LANTCOM in advance of any activity by the user.
The approximate duration of the activity at LANTCOM is known,
and during that time the LANTCOM security data base is updated
to reflect any changes in the user's status.
Effects : a. Network traffic . The level of network traffic required
to support send-ahead security is between the levels required to
support remote-only and local-only security. In addition, the
level of traffic is better related to the real needs of the
community, in that only users who are active at remote sites
need to have up-to-date security data there.
b. Processor loads . Analogous to effects on network traffic,
c. Reliability . Reliability is also intermediate between
the local-only and remote-only cases. If a user can get on the
network while by-passing a failed local host, he will be able
to access the remote segments only if he has previously sent-ahead
his clearances.
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d. Storage requirements . Analogous to effects on network
traffic.
e. Response time for queries . Not applicable.
f. Ease of update . The update problem is complicated some-
what by the necessity of determining whether (and to whom) security
updates should be sent
.
g. Security . If the means by which security information is
transmitted and maintained is suitably protected, the security of
the send-ahead approach can be equivalent to the remote-only case.
Summary : Send-ahead should be studied further as a reasonable approach
to providing security in a distributed environment. It retains
the features of pre-computer network operations, which is a desirable
goal for the near term. Note that the only difference between
remote-only and send-ahead security is that, in the latter scheme,
data is kept at remote sites only for users who are now or soon
will be active there. Finally, it should be again emphasized
that these security scenarios represent only a small, but critical,
part of the total security question. Substantial research is
needed in this area.
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